This paper is motivated by a large variety of convex or non convex problems arising in symmetric and asymmetric information models. An existence theorem is proven, based on a supermodular version of Hardy-Littlewood's rearrangement inequalities. Sufficient conditions for monotonicity of optimal solutions are provided. Several applications to insurance are given.
Introduction
In many infinite dimensional optimization problems that appear in economics, concavity of the criterion and convexity of the feasible set are required to prove existence of a solution. Furthermore, as was already mentioned by Milgrom and Shannon [21] , analyses of qualitative properties of solutions are based on first order conditions and the implicit function theorem. Hence many non convex infinite dimensional problems cannot be dealt with: asymetric information, non convex costs, non quasi-concave criteria. This is all the more striking since the finite dimensional versions can usually, easily, be coped with. The purpose of this paper is to provide an existence theorem for non convex problems based on rearrangements and supermodularity and sufficient conditions for monotonicity of optimal solutions. We focus on insurance problems but our tools may be used in a large variety of economic problems.
It is well known that, among pairs of random variables with given marginals, comonotone pairs, maximize correlation. This result is closely related to the concept of rearrangement and to rearrangement inequalities. These inequalities introduced by Hardy, Littlewood and Polya [15] have been extensively used in many areas of mathematics (graph theory, matrix theory, numerical analysis, geometry), statistics (rank order tests), calculus of variations ( [4] ) and probability. Marshall and Olkin [20] provide a survey of applications up to the end of the seventies. Rearrangements inequalities are still used and give powerful results in various mathematical subjects. In contrast, rearrangements inequalities have barely been used in insurance.
Comonotone pairs of random variables with given marginals, also maximize a large class of measures of dependence that generalize correlation, based on supermodularity properties and Hardy-Littlewood's inequalities have a supermodular extension.
Supermodularity techniques have been used in a variety of economic subjects for the past twenty years, in particular to cope with lack of convexity. They were first used by Spence and Mirrlees [32] [23] in their signalling and taxation models. Besides incentive theory, they have been used, for example, for monotone comparative statics techniques ), for sensitivity analysis of optimal growth problems (Amir, Mirman and Perkins [2] , Amir [1] ), in supermodular games (Topkis [33] [34], Vives [35] , MilgromRoberts [22] , Sobel [31] ) and for stochastic orders (see Gollier [14] and Muller Stoyan [25] ).
The main tool of the paper is the supermodular extension of HardyLittlewood's inequalities mentionned above. It is worth noting that, in the special case where they are the most often used, these inequalities may be proven by incentive theoretical arguments. These inequalities are used to prove an existence theorem for a class of infinite dimensionnal non convex problems with equality and inequality constraints. We then provide sufficient conditions for monotonicity of optimal solutions. We then show that our results may be applied to a large variety of convex or non convex problems arising in insurance. We first consider symmetric information models. We prove that optimal contracts exist and that the comonotony property of agents' wealths of von-Neumann Morgenstern models, are still true when agents have strictly "Schur concave" (or strictly second order stochastic dominance preserving) utilities. Let us recall that most "Schur concave" utilities are not concave. We next deal with costs. The hypothesis that costs are convex, standard in microeconomics, has been quite criticized in insurance because of the presence of administrative and audit costs (see Gollier [13] , Huberman et al [16] and Picard [27] , [28] ). Gollier [13] and Picard [27] , [28] consider a cost function with a jump at zero and affine elsewhere, while Huberman et al [16] use concave cost functions. In the case of Gollier's and Picard's cost, we show that optimal contracts exist and that any solution has to be a disappearing deductible. Although, we do not deal with concave costs, in that case, one may easily show that optimal contracts exist and are nondecreasing. Our method can also be used to deal with background risk (see Dana and Scarsini [12] ). We then turn to principal agent, asymmetric information models. We study a deterministic version of Landsberger and Meilijson's adverse selection. We prove existence of optimal contracts and describe some of their qualitative properties. A companion paper [9] , is devoted to the case of moral hazard in the standard model of wage contracts and in insurance.
The paper is organized as follows. In section two, we recall the concept of rearrangement of a Borel function on [0, 1] with respect to any nonatomic probability measure. We then state a supermodular version of HardyLittlewood's inequality. We prove it , in a special case by incentive theoritical arguments. In section three, we prove an existence theorem for non convex problems based on rearrangements and provide sufficient conditions for monotonicity of optimal solutions. We then turn to applications. A section is devoted to the problem of efficient insurance contracts. The case where insurer and insured have symmetric information and are von Neumann Morgenstern maximizers is first studied, as a benchmark, by rearrangement techniques. Properties of efficient insurance contracts that remain true in non convex settings are emphasized. We next generalize the model to nonexpected utility maximizers with "Schur concave" utilities. We then study the non convex problem of efficient insurance contracts when the cost structure includes a fixed cost per claim. The last section is devoted to a deterministic version of Landsberger and Meilijson's adverse selection model [17] . We prove existence of optimal contracts and give some of their qualitative properties.
Rearrangements : a brief review
In this section, we recall the concept of rearrangement of a function with respect to any non atomic probability measure and state some of its properties.
Given x, a Borel function defined on [0, 1], in the rearrangement literature, one usually considers the rearrangement of x with respect to Lebesgue measure. It is also called the "generalized inverse of the distribution function of x" in probability (x is then considered as a random variable on the space ([0, 1], B, λ) with λ the Lebesgue measure and B the Borel σ-algebra of [0, 1]). It is defined as follows: let F x be the distribution function of x:
The rearrangement of x (with respect to λ) or generalized inverse of F x is defined by:
One easily verifies that F −1 x is nondecreasing and that it is distributed like x. From now on, we assume that we are given a nonatomic Borel probability measure µ on [0, 1]. 
Definitions and basic properties
3. for every random variable Z with probability distribution µ, x(Z) and y(Z) have the same probability distribution.
In the sequel, the fact that two Borel functions x and y are equimeasurable with respect to µ will simply be denoted by x ∼ y. Given x, there exists a unique (up to µ a.e. equivalence) nondecreasing function which is equimeasurable to x. This function is called the nondecreasing rearrangement of x with respect to µ. 
Proposition 1 Let
The proof can be found in the appendix. From now on, x will denote the nondecreasing rearrangement of x (with respect to µ). We shall also use the nonincreasing rearrangement of x which equals: −( −x).
Remark. The necessity of the nonatomicity condition on µ in proposition 1 is quite clear, as the following example shows : assume that µ = We end this paragraph by Ryff's decomposition theorem: roughly speaking any function x can be written as the composition of its nondecreasing rearrangement x and a permutation. What we mean by permutation relies on the concept of measure preserving maps:
In other words, s is measure-preserving with respect to µ if its nondecreasing rearrangement with respect to µ is the identity map. Equivalently:
for every bounded continuous function f .
The following result was proven by Ryff in [30] , for the sake of simplicity, we assume, as in [30] Ryff's decomposition in fact extends to the case of more general measures and even to a multidimensional framework but we omit it here for the sake of simplicity.
Rearrangement inequalities
In this paragraph, we shall see that integral expressions of the form:
increase when one replaces the arbitrary functions x(.) and y(.) by their nondecreasing rearrangements x(.) and y(.) when the integrand L satisfies a supermodularity condition. By definition, a function L :
The function L is called strictly supermodular if for all (
such that x 2 > x 1 and y 2 > y 1 :
Theorem 1 Let µ be a nonatomic probability measure on
and L be supermodular. We then have:
L(x(t), y(t))dµ(t).

Moreover if L is continuous and strictly supermodular, then the inequality is strict unless x and y are comonotone, that is fulfill:
In particular, if L is continuous and strictly supermodular, then
Note that the inequality given above can be written in probabilistic terms as:
for every random variable Z with probability law µ.
It seems that the first author who emphasized the role of supermodularity in rearrangement inequalities is Lorentz in [18] . The first assertion follows from Cambanis et al. [3] . Indeed, in [3] , it is proven that if (Ω, A, P ) and (Ω , A , P ) are two probability spaces and X and Y (respec-
whenever L(., .) is supermodular. The result may then be applied to the pairs (x(Z), y(Z)) and ( x(Z), y(Z)) since by construction x(Z) ∼ x(Z) and y(Z) ∼ y(Z) and the pair ( x(Z), y(Z))
is comonotone. The second assertion is proven in [6] . Finally, we refer the reader to [4] where several interesting generalizations of the inequality of Theorem 1 are proven.
When
and a sufficient condition for strict supermodularity of L is the SpenceMirrlees type condition:
There are many examples of functions L that satisfy (1). Let us mention functions of the form L(x, y) = f (x)g(y) with both f and g nondecreasing,
The concave case U (x − y) will show of particular interest in applications. If L(x, y) = xy, we get the classical Hardy-Littlewood's inequality:
which also means that the covariance of x(Z) and y(Z) is greater than that of x(Z) and y(Z) for every random variable Z with probability law µ.
We have defined the concept of rearrangement of a Borel function with respect to a probability measure µ on [0, 1]. The definition and properties may be extended to non-atomic measures on [0,x], for anyx.
Rearrangements and adverse selection models
In this section, we highlight the tight connections that there are between rearrangement techniques and unidimensional adverse selection modelsà la Mussa and Rosen [24] . In this paragraph we shall prove theorem 1 in the special case where x is the identity function and the distribution function of µ is the Lebesgue measure by means of incentive-theoretical arguments.
Let us consider a standard (quasi-linear) averse selection model in which the unobservable type is scalar and the agent's utility function is:
where t ∈ [0, 1] is the agent's unobservable characteristic or type, x ∈ R + is a consumption and p ∈ R + is a price. Assume for simplicity, that types are uniformly distributed in the population i.e. according to the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1] and that L is twice continuously differentiable and fulfills Spence-Mirrlees condition (4).
The purpose of an uninformed principal is to set an incentive compatible contract that is a pair of functions
such that:
x(.) is the allocation or physical part of the contract (x(.), p(.)) and p(.) its monetary part. An allocation function t → x(t) is implementable if there exists p(.) such that the pair (x(.), p(.)) is incentive compatible. 
Proposition 3 Let x be a measurable allocation function:
[0, 1] → R such that t → L(t, x(t)) issup 1 0 L(t, y(t))dt : y ∼ x ,
x is nondecreasing.
Proof: The equivalence between 1) and 3) is well-known (see for instance Rochet [29] ). To prove that 3) ⇒ 2), let us assume that x is nondecreasing. 3) being equivalent to 1), x is implementable. Let p(.) be such that (x(.), p(.)) is incentive compatible and let y ∼ x. Then y = x = x. From Ryff's decomposition, there exists a Lebesgue measure-preserving map s :
y(t)) − p(s(t))
Integrating this inequality over [0, 1] and using the fact that s is measurepreserving, we obtain assertion 2):
Let us finally prove that 2) ⇒ 3). Assume that x satisfies 2). Let t and t be two Lebesgue points of s → L(s, x(s)) with 0 < t < t < 1 and let
Passing to the limit, we obtain that:
which, with the strict supermodularity of L, yields x(t ) ≥ x(t).
For similar results in a multidimensional type framework and more general measures we refer to [5] . The equivalence between 1) and 2) can be interpreted as follows: x is implementable if and only if there is no other allocation profile with the same distribution that induces a higher surplus. Finally, let us note that a straightforward consequence of the previous proposition is the rearrangement inequality:
Existence via monotonicity
In this section, we prove the existence of nondecreasing solutions for a class of optimization problems by using theorem 1. We mention that a similar method was used by by Cardaliaguet and Tahraoui in [4] , for a broad class of calculus of variations problems.
Let us first recall a compactness property of the set of nondecreasing functions due to Helly (see for instance [26] Let µ be a nonatomic Borel probability measure on [0, 1], we consider the following optimization problem:
where C is a constrained set of the form C := C 1 ∩ C 2 ∩ C 3 with:
and we make the following assumptions:
• either γ(.) is continuous or γ(.) is l.s.c. and bounded from below and L satisfies the additional monotonicity condition: for all (t, x, z, z , P )
• x 0 and x 1 are nondecreasing and bounded on [0, 1] with x 0 ≤ x 1 ,
. . , k 2 , and for all P ∈ K, (t, x) → g j (t, x, P ) is supermodular.
• C = ∅.
Let us first make a few comments on the assumptions. We assume that the criterion is of the form E(L (Z, x(Z), E(γ(x(Z)) ), P ) with L supermodular with respect to its first two arguments. We have in mind insurance problems where typically the criterion depends on the risk Z, the contract x(Z), the premium P . When the insurer is risk neutral, then the premium equals the expected cost of the contractE(γ(x(Z))) and the criterion becomes E(L (Z, x(Z), E(γ(x(Z))) ). It should be noticed that no convexity assumption is made on the cost function γ, we only require it to be l.s.c. In particular the cost function may be concave (see [16] ) or may have a discontinuity at zero (see [13] ). As far as the constraints are concerned, the functions
with U concave, then L satisfies the first assumption listed above. The next result expresses that C is stable under rearrangements.
Lemma 2 For
Proof: For notational purpose we may without loss of generality omit the dependence in P in this proof. To prove that C 1 is stable under rearrangements, let us remark that if (x, y) ∈ (L ∞ ([0, 1], B, µ)) 2 are such that x ≤ y µ-a.e., then x ≤ y µ-a.e. This may be checked directly from the formulas defining x and y but let us give a proof using Theorem 1. Indeed, let L(x, y) := −(x − y) + for every (x, y) ∈ R 2 . If x ≤ y µ-a.e., as L satisfies (1), we have:
which proves that x ≤ y µ-a.e. C 2 is stable under rearrangements by equimeasurability. Lastly a direct consequence of Theorem 1 is that integral constraints of the form 
g(t, x(t))dµ(t) ≥ 0
are also stable under rearrangement, provided that the function g is supermodular. Hence C 3 is stable under rearrangements.
Let us now turn to our main existence result:
Theorem 2 Under the assumptions listed above, problem (6) has a solution.
Furthermore, if (x, P ) is a solution of (6) , then ( x, P ) is also a solution of (6) . If, in addition, L is strictly supermodular with respect to its first two arguments, then any solution (x, P ) of (6) satisfies x = x µ-a.e..
The proof can be found in the appendix.
Remark. In moral hazard problem, the measure µ depends on endogenous effort parameters. The previous existence theorem may easily be extended provided µ has a density continuous with respect to these parameters (see Carlier and Dana [9] ).
Pareto efficient insurance contracts
The benchmark model
We first recall the model of efficient insurance contracts when insurer and insured have symmetric information and are von Neumann Morgenstern maximizers. Our aim is to establish properties of efficient insurance contracts that will remain true in non convex settings, by using tools from the previous sections.
Insurance buyers face a loss X where X is a random variable with support [0, x] and nonatomic probability law µ. The insurance market provides insurance contracts for this loss. A contract is characterized by a premium P and an indemnity schedule I : [0, x] → R which satisfies 0 ≤ I(x) ≤ x µ a.e. on [0, x] . When the insured buys the contract, he is endowed with the random wealth W (X) := w 0 − P − X + I(X) where w 0 is the insured's initial wealth. For the sake of simplicity, from now on, we normalize w 0 = 0.
The insured is assumed to have von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over random wealth:
where U : R → R is strictly concave, and strictly increasing. His indirect utility over contracts is:
By selling the contract the insurer gets P and promises to pay I(x) if loss x occurs. His profit π(P, I) is assumed here to be of the following form
c(I(x))dµ(x)
where the cost function c : R + → R satisfies : c(0) = 0 and c is convex, continuous and increasing on [0, +∞).
Our aim is to study Pareto efficient contracts. For the sake of completeness, we recall some definitions.
Definition 3 1) A contract (P, I) is Pareto efficient iff there exists no contract (P , I ) such that u(P , I ) ≥ u(P, I), π(P , I ) ≥ π(P, I) with at least one strict equality. 2) Two contracts (P, I) and (P , I ) are utility equivalent iff u(P, I) = u(P , I ) and π(P, I) = π(P , I ).
3
) The contract (P, I) dominates (resp strictly dominates) the contract (P , I ) if u(P, I) ≥ u(P , I ) and π(P, I) ≥ π(P , I ) (resp with at least one strict inequality).
Let Id : R + → R + be defined by Id(t) = t for all t ≥ 0. As usual, we may parametrize Pareto efficient contracts by the profit level λ of the insurer. A contract (P, I) is Pareto efficient iff there exists λ ∈ R such that it is a solution of
The following result is very well-known. We however provide a new proof as a prototype of proof that we shall use in more complicated models. 
Proposition 4 For every profit level λ, P(λ) has a unique solution (P
Proof: Since π(., I) is increasing and u(., I) is decreasing, one may replace in P(λ) the constraint π(P, I) ≥ λ by π(P, I) = λ or, equivalently by
P = λ + E(c(I)). Let L(t, x, z) := U (x − t − z − λ). Then P(λ) is equivalent to: sup I x 0
L(t, I(t), E(c(I)))dµ(t) s.t. 0 ≤ I ≤ Id
Since (t, x) → L(t, x, z) is supermodular as a concave function of x − t, Theorem 2 applies: there exists a nondecreasing solution I * of P(λ). Its uniqueness follows from the strict concavity of U and the convexity of c. The associated premium P * verifies P * = E(c(I * )).
To prove the last assertion of the proposition, let Z * := −I * +Id, and Z * be the nondecreasing rearrangement of Z * . Then Z * clearly is the optimal solution of the problem:
Applying theorem 1 to the function g(t, z) = c(t − z) (with c convex), we have
and 0 ≤ Z * ≤ Id, therefore Z * is also a solution of (7). Since the solution is unique, Z * = Z * which proves the desired result
Remark.
1. We have assumed here that a contract is a function of the loss. We could have assumed more generally that the loss is a random variable on a probability space (Ω, A, P ) and that a contract is a function I : Ω → R + . It may be shown (see for example Carlier Dana [8] ) that Pareto efficient contracts exist by a topological argument and that they are comonotone, hence nondecreasing 1-Lipschitz function of X.
2.
A much finer characterization of efficient contract may be obtained in this model by using first order conditions and the additively separable structure. The optimal contract is a "generalized deductible". It satisfies I(x) = 0 for x ∈ [0, a] and the functions I and Id − I are nondecreasing on x ≥ a. Our point is to emphasize the properties of contracts that are robusts to perturbations of the model. 
V (P − c(I(x)))dµ(x)
with V : R → R strictly increasing, strictly concave.
The case of non-expected utilities
The model is as in the previous section except that we do not assume agents to be expected utility maximizers. The risk has a nonatomic probabilty law µ
for every concave increasing function U : R → R (respectively the inequality is strict for any strictly concave increasing function U : R → R ).
Let V : L ∞ → R and W : R + × L ∞ → R be the insured and insurer's utility. In this new setting, a contract (P, I) is a Pareto-efficient contract if and only there exists λ ∈ R such that (P, I) is a solution of Q(λ):
We assume the following on V and W (P, Z):
• If P n → P and Z n → Z pointwise, then limsup W (P n , Z n ) ≤ W (P, Z).
• For every Z, W (., Z) is continuous.
(U2)
• V is "strictly monotone" : for all Y ≥ 0 a.e. Y = 0 and all
• W (., Z) is strictly increasing for every Z.
Assumption U3 is often called "strong risk aversion" (resp "strictly strong aversion"). Examples and characterizations of strongly risk averse utilities may be found in [10] .
Remark. It follows from (U3) that if X and Y have same distribution, then V (X) = V (Y ) and W (P, X) = W (P, Y ). V and W satisfy (U1), (U2) and (U3) 
Theorem 3 Assume that
Proof:
We may assume without loss of generality that a contract is nondecreasing. Indeed let I be any feasible contract and letĨ be its nondecreasing rearrangement with respect to µ. Let us show that
) fulfills (U3), and since I ∼Ĩ,
To show the existence of an optimal solution, let (P n , I n ) be a maximizing sequence with I n nondecreasing. From (U2), V (−P ) → −∞ as P → ∞. Hence the sequence P n is bounded and by Helly's theorem, the sequence (P n , I n ) has a limit point (P * , I * )(with I n → I * pointwise and I * nondecreasing). Clearly 0
To show that Id−I * is nondecreasing, let Z * = −Id+I * and letZ * be its nonincreasing rearrangement w.r. to µ. We have
is continuous for every Z, thus (P * − ε,Z * + Id) for some ε > 0 is feasible and dominates (P * , I * ) contradicting its optimality. Hence Z * =Z * as was to be proven.
Pareto efficient insurance contracts when the insurer's cost function is discontinuous
We consider the problem of efficient insurance contracts when the cost structure includes a fixed cost per claim in a framework introduced by Gollier [13] .
This problem appears naturally in existing models of deterministic auditing (see Picard [27] , [28] and Carlier and Dana [7] ).
The model is the same as in subsection 4.1 except that the cost function c : R + → R has a discontinuity at zero: It satisfies: c(0) = 0 < c(0 + ) and c is convex and increasing on (0, +∞). The jump c(0 + ) > 0 is interpreted as a fixed cost. An important example is the case of an audit cost. Under our assumptions, the cost function is only lower semi-continuous and is not convex on R + .
Since c is l.s.c., one may apply Theorem 2 to obtain: We next prove that efficient contracts have classical monotonicity properties on the set of damages with positive indemnity. Remark.
Proposition 6 If
1. In the particular case where the cost function is affine on (0, +∞), one may easily show that any optimal contract is of the form
2. Utilities preserving second order stochastic dominance may also be considered in this example. One may show that any solution is nondecreasing and for any solution I * , Id−I * is nondecreasing on the set {I * > 0}.
3. In order to obtain existence and the monotonicity of any solution, any lower-semi continuous cost function may be used. In particular, optimal solutions exist and are nondecreasing in the case of concave continuous costs.
A deterministic version of Landsberger and Meilijson adverse selection model
We consider now a deterministic version of an adverse selection model introduced by Landsberger and Meilijson [17] . There are two types l = H, L of insurance buyers who face a loss X l , l = H, L where X l is a random variable with support [0, x] and probability law µ l . It is assumed that µ H is absolutely continuous with respect to µ L with density R. We assume that R fulfills the monotone likelihood ratio property:
The insurance market provides menus of insurance contracts. A menu of contracts is a pair ((P l , I l ), l = H, L) where P l is the premium paid by agent of type l and I l : [0, x] → R is the indemnity schedule. When the insured of type l buys the contract (P l , I l ), he is endowed with the random wealth W l (X l ) := w 0l − P l − X l + I l (X l ). For the sake of simplicity, from now on, we normalize w 0l = 0. The insured of type l is assumed to have von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over random wealth:
where U l : R → R is strictly concave, strictly increasing and C 1 . His indirect utility over contracts is:
We denote by F the set of feasible menus.
Let C 0 l denote the certainty equivalent of the no-insurance wealth of type l :
We assume that the insurer is a risk neutral monopolist who maximizes profit. There is a proportion λ of agents with high risk. He therefore solves the following problem:
We first state a lemma which may be found in Landsberger and Meilijson.
Lemma 3 Assume (H2). Any feasible menu ((P
l , I l ), l = H,
L) such that insured with high risk do not get full insurance is dominated by the feasible menu where insured with high risk get full insurance.
We may therefore reduce the insurer's problem to the following:
, we may rewrite the above problem as
We thus have:
Proposition 7 Assume (H1) and (H2).
There exists an optimal feasible menu. At any optimal menu, agents with high risk are offered full insurance. Furthermore, at any optimal menu, there exists an optimal menu where insured have same utilities and the insurer same profit such that the wealth of the insured with low risk is nonincreasing.
is supermodular, we may apply theorem 2, hence there exists an optimal feasible menu with Id−I * L nondecreasing. Agents with high risk are offered full insurance and the insured with low risk has nonincreasing wealth. The second assertion follows from the fact that any feasible menu (P H , Id, P L , I L ) is weakly dominated by a feasible menu
Remark. Landsberger and Meilijson further show that at any optimal menu, the high risk incentive constraint (I.C.H) is binding while the individual rationality constraint for low risk (I.R.L) is binding.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
It may be checked that x given in the proposition is right-continuous nondecreasing, that v is left-continuous nondecreasing and one has:
Let us prove that x ∼ x, to that end let us note that, using (13) for u ∈ R , we have:
but by definition of v and nonatomicity of µ, we have
since this holds for all u we have x ∼ x. It remains to prove that x defined above is the unique nondecreasing function distributed as x up to µ-a.e. equivalence. Assume that f is nondecreasing and f ∼ x hence f ∼ x. Since f is nondecreasing, for every u ∈ R {f (.) ≥ u} is either empty or an interval of the form [g(u), 1] or (g(u), 1] where g is nondecreasing. Since f ∼ x, µ is nonatomic and by (13) , for all u ∈ R , we get:
If x(t) < f(t), let q ∈ Q ∩ ( x(t), f(t)] we then have g(q) ≤ t < v(q).
In particular t ∈ [g(q), v(q)] and by (14) , µ ([g(q) , v(q)]) = 0, since q ∈ Q is arbitrary in the previous reasoning, we may conclude that { x < f} is µ-negligible. Similarly, one obtains that { x > f} is µ-negligible. This proves the claim of uniqueness.
Proof of Theorem 2
Let us first remark that our assumptions imply that the value of program (6) is finite. Note also that, as γ( x)dµ, it follows from Theorem 1 that J( x, P ) ≥ J(x, P ).
Let (x n , P n ) be a maximizing sequence of (6) . From lemma 2, ( x n , P n ) fulfills the constraints and J( x n , P n ) ≥ J(x n , P n ). Hence, replacing x n by x n , we still have a maximizing sequence. We may thus assume that each x n is nondecreasing. As elements of C are uniformly bounded by x 0 (0 + ) and x 1 (1 − ), we may assume by Lemma 1 that x n converges pointwise to some nondecreasing function x * , by compactness it may also be assumed that P n converges to some P * ∈ K. Obviously, (x * , P * ) ∈ C 1 and by Lebesgue's dominated convergence Theorem, one also has (x * , P * ) ∈ C 2 ∩ C 3 .
It remains to prove that (x * , P * ) is a solution of (6) . If γ is continuous, it follows from Lebesgue's dominated convergence Theorem that Applying Lebesgue's dominated convergence Theorem one more time, we obtain that J(x n , P n ) converges to J(x * , P * ) which implies that (x * , P * ) is a solution of (6) .
If γ is only l.s.c. and L is nonincreasing with respect to its third argument, we first get:
Fatou's Lemma then yields:
As L is nonincreasing with respect to its third argument, this implies for every t ∈ [0, 1], limsup L(t, x n (t),
Applying Fatou's Lemma again, we get limsup J(x n , P n ) ≤ J(x * , P * ) which proves that (x * , P * ) is a solution of (6).
To prove the last assertion, let us note that if L is strictly supermodular with respect to (t, x), then by Theorem 1, J( x, P ) > J(x, P ) unless x = x µ-a.e.
